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1Executive summary
DAVID DOLLAR
More than two-thirds of world trade occurs through global value chains (GVCs), in which production crosses at least one border, and typically many borders, before final assembly. The phenomenal 
growth in GVC-related trade has translated into significant eco-
nomic growth in many countries across the globe over the last 
two decades, fueled by reductions in transportation and com-
munication costs and declining trade barriers. But, at the same 
time, it has contributed to distributional effects that mean that 
the benefits of trade have not always accrued to all, which has, at 
least in part, been a driver in the backlash against globalization 
and the rise of protectionism and threats to global and regional 
trade agreements. In addition, new technological developments 
such as robotics, big data, and the Internet of Things (IoT) are 
beginning to reshape and further transform GVCs. This second 
GVC development report takes stock of the recent evolution of 
GVC trade in light of these developments.
Update on trends in GVCs
The growth of global value chains has slowed since the global 
financial crisis. A country’s GDP (value added) can be decom-
posed into purely domestic, traditional trade, in which a product 
is made in one country and consumed in another, simple value 
chain trade, in which a good made in one country crosses one 
border and is used in production in the partner country before 
consumption there, and complex value chain trade, in which 
production crosses multiple borders. From 2000-2007, GVCs, 
especially complex ones, were expanding at a faster rate than 
other components of GDP. During the global financial crisis there 
was naturally some retrenchment of GVCs, followed by quick 
recovery (2010-2011) but since then, with the exception of 2017, 
growth has, in the main, slowed. In 2017 expansion of complex 
GVCs was faster than GDP growth, but it is too early to say if this 
is a new trend or just a one-year blip.
Concerning which sectors are particularly amenable to 
GVCs, over a long period we found that, the higher the technol-
ogy (knowledge) intensity of a sector, the more significant the 
increase of complex GVC activities. Thus, GVC linkages are espe-
cially important for high-tech sectors and it is in these areas that 
we see highly complex value chains involving many countries. 
We also distinguish between intra-regional GVC activities and 
inter-regional ones. Activities within North American economies 
would be an example of the former, whereas China’s growing 
contribution to value chains centered on the U.S. or Germany 
would be examples of the latter. Between 2000 and 2017, the 
weight of intra-regional GVC activities in “Factory Asia” came to 
exceed that of “Factory North America”. In contrast, the share of 
intra-regional GVC activities declined relatively in both Europe 
and North America and their share of inter-regional production 
sharing activities increased, especially their GVC linkages with 
“Factory Asia”, reflecting in large part increased inter-connect-
edness with China. China is increasingly playing an important 
role as both a supply and demand hub in traditional trade and 
simple GVC networks, although the U.S. and Germany are still 
the most important hubs in complex GVC networks.
GVC analysis also provides some insight into bilateral trade 
balances and how they should be interpreted. In a world in which 
most trade consists of parts and components, bilateral trade 
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balances are significantly affected by the supply and demand of 
third countries; and, net imports are no longer a proper measure 
of the impact of an international trade shock on the domestic 
economy in the age of GVCs, compared to the time when final 
goods trade dominated. China happens to be at the end of 
many Asian value chains, taking sophisticated components from 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Chinese Taipei and assembling 
these into final products. Two-thirds of all intermediate imports 
of information and communication technology (ICT) products, 
coming from other countries in Factory Asia, but also with signif-
icant contributions from Europe and North America, are used as 
inputs into Chinese exports. Indeed, the Chinese domestic value 
content of their exports of ICT products accounts for only around 
half of the total export value. As such, trade balances look very 
different in value-added terms. For example, the U.S. trade defi-
cit in ICT products with China is roughly cut in half if the calcula-
tion is made in value added terms.
Labor market effects of GVCs in developed 
countries
One of the main controversies of globalization is its effect on 
labor markets in both developed and developing economies. 
Across advanced economies, the real median wage has grown 
slowly over the past two decades and manufacturing employ-
ment has been on the decline, while incomes of highly skilled 
workers and owners of capital have soared. There are of course 
many factors at work here, and not all are related to globaliza-
tion, especially countries’ own domestic tax and transfer policies, 
but one additional factor has been big developing countries, 
especially China and Eastern European economies, opening up 
and joining the global economy. 
A number of studies have concluded that, in particular, the 
impact of Chinese import competition on the U.S. labor market, 
especially after China joined the WTO, was a significant factor 
behind U.S. manufacturing employment dropping sharply after 
2000. But these analyses have typically only provided a partial 
view of the overall impact on employment, by and large ignoring 
the reality of value chains. A full view requires that we account for 
the fact that the development of value chains results in churning 
across economies, as firms and countries specialize and create 
certain types of jobs while eliminating others. General equilib-
rium analyses of the so-called “China shock” that take account 
of GVCs find that, for the U.S., trade was not a main contribu-
tor to the loss of manufacturing jobs and has only minor aggre-
gate employment effects. One important reason for this more 
nuanced effect is that while some industries contracted because 
of increased competition, others expanded thanks to the cost 
savings that GVC linkages provided, counterbalancing jobs lost 
in contracting industries. This is consistent with economic theory, 
which suggests that trade should not have a large net effect on 
employment. 
That being said, the effects vary considerably across regions 
and individuals with different skill levels. Moving from the 
nationwide and sectoral level to regional and individual outcomes 
reveals substantial heterogeneity in how aggregate effects map 
out. For instance, when local labor markets within countries are 
not sufficiently diversified, trade can widen regional disparities. 
Regions specialized in import-competing and upstream industries 
can fall behind, while areas with industries that export or benefit 
from cost savings due to cheaper imported inputs pull away. 
Similarly, trade may work in the same direction as other drivers 
in contributing to labor market polarization. In particular, automa-
tion has impacted jobs in the middle of the skills distribution, with 
remaining jobs concentrated at the high and low ends. Between 
1999 and 2007, the years when China was reducing barriers and 
entering the WTO, nearly all advanced economies had increases 
in employment shares for high- and low-skilled jobs, and declines 
for middle-skill work (see Figure 1). 
While trade and automation are making a country as a whole 
richer, there is a need for adjustment policies to ensure a more 
even distribution of these gains. This is especially the case as 
value chains magnify trade-induced changes in skill requirements 
and thereby raise the demand for worker flexibility and the need 
for training support. With regard to the optimal design of such 
policies, value chains make targeted or specific labor market 
interventions increasingly difficult. As input-output linkages 
cause trade shocks to spread more widely within economies, 
import competition is less and less limited in terms of industries, 
regions, or skill levels. As a result, it can become more difficult to 
identify the exact reason for individual displacement. Therefore, 
adjustment policies should not differentiate between the various 
reasons for worker displacement, such as automation or trade, 
and be less dependent on affected workers fulfilling certain 
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conditions. In addition, mobility and place-based policies could 
usefully complement general labor market policies to address 
regional divergence. 
Labor market effects of GVCs in developing 
countries
The emergence of global value chains has offered developing 
countries new opportunities to integrate into the global econ-
omy. This has fundamental impacts on where jobs go, who gets 
them, and what type of jobs they are. Significant parts of the 
developing world are deeply involved in GVCs. Their input has 
been initially concentrated in labor-intensive activities, which may 
have had important impacts on poverty in developing countries. 
For example, the boom in exports to the United States following 
the US–Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement of 2001 was partic-
ularly beneficial to wages of unskilled workers, reduced the skill 
premium, and was a key driver of poverty reduction in Viet Nam 
because it was concentrated in unskilled, labor-intensive GVC 
sectors, most notably textiles. 
There is a positive association between output growth and 
employment growth within GVC sectors, which increased over-
all welfare as workers moved out of agriculture or the informal 
sector toward better paying, higher value-added jobs. Women 
who previously had difficulty accessing this type of wage work 
have filled many of these jobs. Employment and wage impacts 
can happen both directly within exporting firms as well as indi-
rectly through these firms’ demand for goods and services from 
the domestic economy. The extent to which GVCs interact with 
domestic labor thus depends on the linkages of exporting firms 
to domestic, input-supplying firms. The firms that export directly 
account for only a small part of GVC jobs. In Viet Nam, most 
of the job creation results from backward linkages – that is, in 
indirect exporting firms that supply inputs to the direct exporters 
(see Figure 2).
The relationship between GVC integration and level of 
employment though is not necessarily positive in all contexts. 
Imports of goods and services (backward GVC participation) 
matter as much as exports of intermediates (forward GVC partici-
pation) to be successful in GVCs, where opening up to imports is 
often a pre-condition to successfully export. However, there may 
be import-competing effects in labor markets. 
Evidence as well as intuition suggests that GVC participation 
will have other distributional implications. Greater participation 
of developing countries in global trade is expected to integrate 
not only markets for products, services, finance and technology, 
but also, directly and indirectly, markets for labor. The hallmark 
of globalization is big developing countries opening up and join-
ing global trade. In general, such economies are abundant in 
unskilled labor and scarce in skilled labor and capital relative to 
global averages. The factor-endowment theory of trade predicts 
that trade will reduce returns to unskilled labor in advanced econ-
omies while raising returns to capital and skilled labor. This trend 
has generally been observed. But the opposite trend should 
occur in developing countries that open up: wages of unskilled 
workers, clearly the most abundant factor in many developing 
countries, should rise faster than other factor rewards. This has 
not happened in most developing countries; rather, employment 
creation and wage gains have been biased towards more skilled 
workers. GVC expansion in developing countries is associated 
with higher relative demand for skilled workers. Characteristics 
of GVCs themselves, by supporting more complex industrial 
organization, as well as services inputs that are complementary 
to value chains, can be skill-biased.
Automation may be threatening GVC jobs in developing 
countries in the long term, where the routine tasks more suscep-
tible to automation are increasingly performed. Technological 
FIGURE 2 Many jobs in Viet Nam are tied to exports, directly and indirectly 
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advancements that largely get diffused through global value 
chains are affecting how GVCs support jobs in developing coun-
tries. Evidence suggests that changes in efficiency in GVCs has 
negative impacts on employment linked to countries’ participa-
tion in the global production of products, all else equal. Tech-
nological innovation has also lowered the demand for low-skilled 
workers relatively more than compared to high-skilled workers. 
Nevertheless, the adverse effects of changing production tech-
nologies and efficiencies on employment have been offset by 
increased consumer demand, whereby the domestic consump-
tion expenditures in large emerging economies such as China and 
India will generate new demand for labor for the global economy
These distributional consequences of trade and other forces 
are a principal concern to policymakers. Policies also play an 
important role in mediating the relationship between GVCs and 
employment in developing countries. These include policies that 
support (i) participation of developing countries in GVCs, (ii) fos-
tering positive spillovers from GVC participation, (iii) upgrading 
to higher value-added tasks within GVCs, and (iv) mediating neg-
ative effects from winners, such as inequality.
Technological progress, diffusion, and 
opportunities for developing countries
The nature of technology used in products plays a major role in 
determining the governance structure of value chains and the 
benefits of participation for developing countries. Standardization 
through breaking production into modules with a high degree of 
functional autonomy (limited mutual interference between mod-
ules) can dramatically reduce the amount of R&D, learning by 
doing, and the number of complementary skills needed to pro-
duce a good. This greatly increases opportunities for developing 
country firms to participate in formerly capital-intensive industries 
through reducing entry costs into global value chains. 
However, widespread access to standardized products with 
little ability to modify technical features can lead to an exces-
sive supply of homogeneous products in a local market, resulting 
in intense price competition and limited technology transfer. By 
contrast, technology that facilitates scope for product modifica-
tion and greater interaction with lead manufacturers can help 
boost technology transfer and product upgrading by develop-
ing country firms. Chapter 4 illustrates this interaction between 
changes in technology and opportunities for developing coun-
tries through developments in the automotive and cell phone 
industries in China. 
The chapter argues that policies for helping domestically 
owned firms to become technologically standalone – what some 
might refer to as “techno-nationalism” – do not necessarily 
deliver the expected results in terms of upgrading. The world’s 
most powerful technology companies, both from emerging and 
advanced countries, work with global suppliers and even with 
competitors in “open innovation” environments. Hence, the 
advice to policymakers seeking to upgrade toward the global 
technology frontier is to prioritize measures that encourage 
firms to be full partners in global technology ecosystems and to 
pursue open source innovation solutions.
The question that now remains is whether firms from other 
countries, especially in less/least-developed regions, can repli-
cate the positive experience of leveraging platforms by Chinese 
firms as demonstrated in this chapter. And does automation of 
production even prevent initial entry based on low wages? 
Robotics, 3D printing, the IoT, Big Data, and cloud comput-
ing, among others, are transforming entire industries. The evi-
dence suggests that automation reduces some of the incen-
tives for GVCs to relocate to lower-wage countries. However, it 
is also seen that automation does not necessarily dampen the 
attractiveness of low-wage destinations, especially for labor-in-
tensive tasks that require human dexterity. In the apparel indus-
try, for example, soft materials like fabrics are difficult to handle 
through automation compared to solid materials such as metal 
or wooden objects, and sewing/stitching can still be out of the 
reach of “robots’ hands”. 
In this sense, automation is likely to have only a limited impact 
on developing countries’ opportunities to participate in value 
chains through the offshoring of production by high-income 
countries, at least in the short term. Foreign direct investment 
flows (greenfield investment) from high-income countries to 
low- and middle-income countries has declined since 2010. Nev-
ertheless, there are important differences across industries and 
between production and assembly tasks within industries. The 
pattern across countries also suggests that some FDI may have 
migrated from China to low-income and middle-income coun-
tries in Asia and Africa and from higher- to lower-income coun-
tries in the Europe and Central Asia region.
While automation does not pose immediate risks to shut the 
door to labor-intensive exports from developing countries, gov-
ernments need to develop a comprehensive digital strategy. Our 
economies are increasingly sitting on a digital foundation, one 
that is generating high-speed growth and disruptive change. 
The employment and investment of tomorrow will be data inten-
sive, and value in a knowledge economy is increasingly created 
by innovative ideas and data. 
Not only is embracing digital technologies good for the 
economy, but it is also good for society. The digitally powered, 
knowledge-intensive GVCs that are emerging and are likely to 
dominate in the coming years have a strong potential for inclu-
sion. As Nobel Prize winner Mike Spence points out, they have 
low marginal costs of production and are non-rival. Moreover, 
they can expand markets for small businesses beyond traditional 
geographies. They can also expand financial inclusion, as data 
on e-commerce can be used as collateral, and smartphones link 
up poorer countries to these opportunities. 
GVCs and digital technology
“Supply Chain 4.0” is the re-organization of supply chains – 
design and planning, production, distribution, consumption, 
and reverse logistics – using technologies that are known as 
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“Industry 4.0”. These technologies emerged in the 21st century 
and are largely implemented by firms that are at the frontier of 
supply chain management in high-income countries. The most 
frequently mentioned supply management techniques are the 
IoT, big data analytics, 3D printing, advanced (autonomous) 
robotics, smart sensors, augmented reality, artificial intelligence, 
and cloud computing. Through these advanced techniques, a 
continuous flow of information between the retailer and supplier 
keeps the shelves stocked and there is no longer a “back room” 
in stores where inventory is kept. 
“Supply Chain 4.0” is about transforming the model of supply 
chain management from a linear model in which instructions 
flow from supplier to producer to distributor to consumer, and 
back, to a more integrated model in which information flows in 
multiple directions. While lead firms are increasingly analyzing 
this information through “supply chain control towers,” the end 
effect of this development is making the goods economy more 
responsive to consumer demand. According to a recent PwC 
(2016a) study on the rise of Industry 4.0, a third of the more than 
2,000 respondents say their companies have started to digitize 
their supply chains, and fully 72% expect to have done so five 
years from now.
In “Supply Chain 4.0”, the internet makes the warehouse vis-
ible to the customer and within the warehouse, some technol-
ogies such as autonomous logistics and robotic transport can 
be employed to substantially improve pick-and-pack perfor-
mance. Business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce consists of links 
in supply chains – whether transactions between parts suppliers 
and assemblers, between distribution centers and retailers, or 
online purchases of services which in many cases support the 
supply chain. B2B commerce can be implemented either through 
websites, much like business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce, or 
through electronic data interchange (EDI) which is a mature tech-
nology through which the computer systems of the buyer and 
seller are directly connected using a common record format. 
To rapidly assess and respond to changes in customer 
demand, tracking and tracing throughout the supply chain 
is enabled through sensing technologies underlying the IoT, 
including radio frequency identification (RFID), Bluetooth, and 
global system for mobile communication (GSM). Applications of 
IoT are increasingly used to facilitate the management strategies 
of “customer-managed inventory” (CMI) or “vendor-managed 
inventory” (VMI) in which information is initially provided by a 
customer and then transmitted up the supply chain to the ware-
house. Technologies such as RFID tags then transmit information 
to the distribution center so that orders can be fulfilled. An EDI 
system causes an order created electronically by the customer to 
be instantly duplicated without error in the vendor’s computer 
system, and the invoice to be similarly electronically duplicated 
in the customer’s computer system. Some of these processes 
are being implemented through blockchain, a distributed ledger 
technology that allows multiple parties to maintain copies of the 
same information in various locations, either in an open manner 
or requiring individual entities’ permission to access the network. 
Its special feature is that historical entries cannot be altered. 
New technologies gather prodigious amounts of data. Big 
data analytics is about using data to drive useful business intel-
ligence, answering the questions, “What just happened?”, “Why 
did it happen?”, and “What are we going to do next?” The ability 
to collect and analyze data gathered in the whole supply chain 
makes it possible to “run scenarios within the platform”, where 
the platform is conceived of as an overarching software solution 
within the supply chain control center. Besides saving time and 
labor, and reducing errors, EDI enables a large amount of data 
capture about customer behavior which can be the basis for 
supply chain analytics using either “big data” or “small data” 
techniques. 
The use of modern technology and human labor in warehouses 
are often complements, rather than substitutes, especially in con-
ditions where e-commerce is substantially increasing demand 
for certain goods and services. E-commerce is a mechanism for 
translating unpaid household shopping time into paid market 
time. Instead of consumers spending time shopping, workers in 
warehouses and on delivery trucks are picking goods off ware-
house shelves and bringing them to the consumer’s front door. 
Most of the jobs being created involve moving goods around 
either in warehouses or delivery vehicles and have many of the 
characteristics of factory work. A study using U.S. data gathered 
in the Occupational Employment Statistics of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, shows that employment in the most dynamic parts of 
the supply chain has grown at a rate substantially exceeding that 
of the overall economy since 2011. These sectors include ware-
housing and storage, couriers and messengers (i.e. express deliv-
ery), and non-store retailers (i.e. e-commerce companies).
Digital technologies and the internet are becoming the foun-
dation of entire economies. There are huge benefits in terms 
of inclusive patterns of growth, innovation and entrepreneurial 
opportunities, but the downside risks are much larger than was 
initially understood. Trade and investment will be vulnerable in 
the near complete absence of international agreements on the 
uses and prohibited abuses of the internet and data.
The digital economy and SMEs
Small and medium-sized enterprises in general have low direct 
participation in international trade, compared to large enter-
prises. This result makes economic sense as long as there are 
fixed costs in exporting, such as learning about foreign markets 
or rules and minimum scales for shipping. In theory, the spread 
of GVCs should reduce these effects and make it easier for SMEs 
to participate in trade as the break-up of the production process 
makes it feasible for a specialized firm to find niche markets. Yet, 
SMEs are underrepresented in GVCs.
This may be changing, however, as access to information and 
communication technology (ICT) continues to grow. For example, 
there is evidence that the internet reduces search costs, facilitat-
ing more exchange and increasing firm productivity. Cross-bor-
der e-commerce platforms are also providing new opportunities 
for SMEs and even micro firms. 
6 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
Using firm-level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Sur-
veys, new research finds that whether a firm has a website on 
the internet facilitates the participation of manufacturing SMEs 
in GVCs and trade. In particular, such SMEs are more likely to use 
foreign inputs for production and export their output. Further, 
ICT connectivity is found to be more important for small firms 
than for large ones when considering whether or not a firm par-
ticipates in trade.
Evidence underlines the importance of ICT access for SMEs to 
join GVCs in the digital economy, however, access to new tech-
nology varies not only between firm size, but also regionally by 
level of development. Infrastructure constraints faced by devel-
oping countries in e-commerce range from the most basic, such 
as access to a steady supply of electricity, to the more complex, 
such as not having access to electronic payment systems or a 
lack of high-speed internet cables. This is a particular problem, 
not only because information communication technology (ICT) is 
necessary for e-commerce, but also because ICT is now consid-
ered a pre-requisite for joining most GVCs. No matter the inter-
net’s functionality, regardless of lacking features such as broad-
band connection and e-commerce platforms, e-commerce can 
only develop if the internet is present. This is in line with empir-
ical studies showing that access to the internet improves export 
performance in developing countries across manufacturing and 
services sectors through reduced search costs and decreased 
distance barriers. Furthermore, the internet has also been shown 
to increase firm productivity, especially of smaller and less inno-
vative firms.
However, SMEs face a number of additional challenges inte-
grating into GVCs with the digital economy. On top of lagging 
behind large firms in terms of overall digital technology use and 
capability, small businesses may also find it difficult to access 
e-commerce platforms and payment systems. National policy 
may also be inadvertently preventing successful internationaliza-
tion of SMEs via GVCs. Complex customs procedures, regulatory 
uncertainty and barriers to services trade all adversely affect 
SMEs and pose challenges to SME participation in GVCs, despite 
the opportunities provided by e-commerce.
These findings underscore the continuing need to improve 
the ICT environment/infrastructure and to expand services such 
as e-payment and e-commerce, all of which benefit SMEs dispro-
portionally, but they also highlight the lack of information regard-
ing SMEs. In theory the digital economy holds potential for SME 
participation in GVCs, but for effective policies to be developed, 
better data will need to be collected.
Should high domestic value added in exports 
be an objective of policy?
Global value chains make it easier for developing countries to 
move away from export reliance on unprocessed primary prod-
ucts to become exporters of manufactures and services. Before 
the development of GVCs, a country had to master the pro-
duction of a whole product in order to export it. GVCs allow 
countries to specialize in a particular activity and join a global 
production network. As a developing country moves from export 
of primary products to export of manufactures and services via 
GVCs, the ratio of domestic value added to gross export value 
tends to fall. Developing countries often start out at the end of 
value chains, with labor-intensive assembly of parts produced 
elsewhere. For some individual products, the ratio of domestic 
value added to gross export value can be very small, maybe only 
a few percentage points. The gross exports from the country can 
be very large, but this is an artifact of the position in the value 
chain. The country’s value added contribution to the export is 
much smaller. Many developing countries worry about this phe-
nomenon and aspire to increase their value added contribution 
to exports. There are a number of reasons why this objective 
should be approached cautiously. It may seem like simple math 
that a higher domestic value added share means more total 
value added exported and hence more GDP. But that simple 
idea ignores the reality that imported goods and services are 
a key support to a country’s competitiveness. If a country artifi-
cially replaces key inputs with inferior domestic versions, the end 
result is likely to be fewer gross exports and less, not more, total 
value added exports.
History provides a number of interesting lessons about this 
issue. First, in almost all countries, developed and developing 
alike, the share of domestic value added in exports has tended to 
trend downwards over time. This reflects the expansion of global 
value chains. Even the countries best known for final products in 
key sectors such as autos, machinery, and electronics rely heav-
ily on imported inputs, both manufactures and services. Many of 
the iconic products in the world, such as BMW cars and iPhones, 
have large amounts of imported inputs that go into final assem-
bly. Developing countries have learned part of this lesson and 
are generally quite open to imports of parts and components. 
However, imported services are also a key input into manufac-
tures, and developing countries tend to be more protectionist 
vis-à-vis services. Both trade in services and investment in ser-
vices (often needed in order to trade the services) tend to be 
more restricted in developing countries, than policies towards 
manufactures. Developing countries that have more imported 
service content in their exports tend to be more persistent and 
successful exporters of manufactures. 
A second point about the ratio of domestic content to gross 
value of exports is that the early East Asian industrializers show 
a highly non-linear trend in this variable. In the case of Japan, 
this ratio fell in the early post-war period as the country opened 
up and began to use imported inputs. In the 1980s, however, 
the ratio increased as Japan became a capable producer of a 
wide range of manufactured intermediates and parts. Since 1990 
there has again been a sharp trend downwards in domestic con-
tent as complex value chains developed throughout Asia. Japan 
is an industrial powerhouse with many successful brands, and it 
is revealing that the domestic content ratio in the most recent 
year is the lowest ever recorded. Being an industrial powerhouse 
does not mean that all activities take place within the border. 
Japanese firms use imported goods and services in a highly 
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efficient manner. The Republic of Korea’s and Chinese Taipei’s 
experiences are very similar to Japan’s, but with a lag. 
China’s recent experience is an important counter-example. 
At the beginning of economic reform there was a sharp drop 
in the domestic value added ratio as the country moved from 
exporting primary products to assembling apparel and elec-
tronics using parts produced in other countries. However, over 
the past decade the ratio has been rising, catching the attention 
of other developing countries. Our research indicates that this 
trend is primarily the result of technological advance in China, 
not the result of restrictive trade policy. What is happening to 
China now is analogous to what happened to Japan in the 1980s 
and the Republic of Korea in the 1990s, as their technological 
capability advanced. If China’s experience continues to be simi-
lar to the earlier industrializers, then the ratio can be expected to 
peak and later decline as labor-intensive activities are off-shored 
to lower wage locations and more imported components and 
parts are used in production to keep Chinese firms competitive 
in international markets. China’s development is likely to be influ-
enced by its “Made in China 2025” industrial policy. This policy 
aims to make China a technology leader in ten advanced manu-
facturing sectors. China has set indicative targets for domestic 
value added in these sectors. In semiconductors, for example, 
China currently imports 90% of usage, but plans to produce 70% 
of usage by 2025, which would be an extraordinary shift. What 
remains unclear is what policy tools China will use. If it restricts 
imports or direct investment in these sectors, it will make its firms 
less competitive, not to mention inflaming global trade tensions. 
Issues in GVC measurement
The proliferation and development of global input-output tables 
in recent years has significantly transformed our ability to inter-
pret global production. But, important though such initiatives 
have been, they are typically silent on the role of multinationals 
in this new landscape. In addition, the policy debate in recent 
years has increasingly focused on ‘inclusive globalization’, refer-
ring to the growing realization that the benefits of globalization 
may not have accrued to all members of society equally, even if 
only as a process of transition. 
With traditional macroeconomic statistics, it is not immediately 
clear, for example, which categories of workers in which countries 
benefit from globalization (and how) and which may have been, 
even if only temporarily, left behind. Moreover, trade in val-
ue-added (TiVA) estimates, derived through the construction of 
a global input-output table, implicitly assume that all firms within 
a given sector have the same production function (input-output 
technical coefficients), import intensity and export intensity. 
This of course has never been true. We know for example 
that larger firms will typically have different production functions 
compared to smaller firms, because of economies of scale, and 
also higher labor productivity. And these firms will also typically 
be more export and, indeed, import orientated than their smaller 
counterparts (reflecting in part the disproportionate costs of 
trade faced by smaller firms compared to larger firms). The same 
generalizations hold true for foreign-owned enterprises, or enter-
prises with affiliates abroad, compared to purely domestic firms; 
for example, the foreign content of exports by foreign-owned 
firms in the transport sector in the United States is twice that of 
domestically owned firms. But TiVA estimates, relying as they do 
on national supply-use and input-output tables, cannot reflect 
these heterogeneities; thus, key measures, such as the import 
content of exports, are downward biased. 
Additional complexities can create significant interpretative 
challenges for users of TiVA type statistics. Because inter-coun-
try input-output tables value transactions at basic, and not 
market, prices, many of the related TiVA analyses reveal only 
some of the story. What is often not fully understood in the use 
of tables valued in basic prices is that they exclude the value that 
is added at the end of the chain by distribution sectors (in par-
ticular retail and wholesale, which often include value associated 
with marketing activities and brands). At the heart of the debate, 
and indeed confusion, is that input-output tables in basic prices 
are in essence a mechanism to provide a view of production, and 
because they remove significant distribution margins at the end 
of the chain, they are less well equipped to provide a perspec-
tive from the consumption point of view. This has a direct impact 
on smile-curve type analyses that describe where sectors are in 
value chains and how far they are from final demand. Moreover, 
although the basic price concept may provide a correct view of, 
for example, the domestic value-added or services content of a 
country’s total exports, it provides an arguably distorted view of 
the same measure of a given good seen from a consumption, 
or free-on-board (FOB) perspective. This is because basic prices 
exclude often significant distribution margins related to trans-
portation from the factory gate to the customs frontier, which 
may also reflect significant contributions from activities related to 
brand, R&D, design, and marketing. For example, the US domes-
tic value-added content of its exports of textiles and clothing in 
FOB prices was around 20% in 2016 compared to 3% using the 
pure basic price approach. 
The basic price approach also limits the scope to reveal addi-
tional dependencies related to globalization, for example jobs 
sustained in retailers through sales of imports. A complementary 
accounting framework is developed in “market” prices to illus-
trate the insights that can be gained through such an approach. 
In the United States, for example, the sale of imports supported 
9.0 million jobs.

